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Pandemic politics—lessons for solar
geoengineering
Holly Buck 1,2✉, Oliver Geden 3,4, Masahiro Sugiyama5 & Olaf Corry 6,7
Responses to the COVID-19 emergency have exposed break-points at the
interface of science, media, and policy. We summarize five lessons that should
be heeded if climate change ever enters a state of emergency perceived to
warrant stratospheric aerosol injection.
The response to the COVID-19 pandemic is a standout example of rapid and drastic action
worldwide. Faced with a global emergency, many countries responded in an anticipatory
manner, based on predictions from computer models: lockdown implementations in the United
States and the United Kingdom followed policymaker briefings on projections of millions of
deaths from the Imperial College epidemiological model, which relied on assumptions from the
limited data available early in the pandemic.
Up to the present, the response to threats from climate change has been much slower in
aggregate, despite some recent progress. However, as the effects of climate change become more
severe, it is possible that rapid action will be deemed desirable. Stratospheric aerosol injection has
been proposed as a fast means of cooling the Earth: a release of reflecting aerosols into the upper
layer of the atmosphere is expected to block a fraction of the incoming sunlight1. Stratospheric
aerosol injection is often framed either as an emergency measure or as an (arguably cheap)
stopgap approach to buy time for mitigation. But awareness is low among the public as well as
policymakers, and there are uncertainties in the simulated climate response to the technique, as
well as uncertainties around potential impacts and governance challenges2.
If the concept of stratospheric aerosol injection leaves the realm of modeling, it will be thrust
into a multi-societal science–media-policy interface that operates in ways that are not currently
anticipated—at least not in idealized model simulations or unitary rational actor governance
scenarios3.
The world’s responses to COVID-19 provide an opportunity to study how the science–media-
policy environment both responds to and shapes the politics of novel risks and emergency
measures. COVID-19 and climate change are very different challenges, and they happen on
different timescales. Nevertheless, responses to both crises must navigate the same political
terrain and the same media ecosystem.
Here, we argue that five important insights from the COVID-19 response can guide efforts to
tackle an emergency scenario in climate change: (1) maintain a broad scope of desirable out-
comes; (2) negotiate fractured governance on the global scale; (3) take into account the volati-
lities of new media technologies; (4) be alert to policymakers’ ulterior motives; and (5) ensure
bought time is well spent.
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Five lessons:
1. Narrow metrics seem user-friendly—but can create new
problems.
Using narrow metrics to define a problem, or the success of
a policy, can obscure other important goals. The response to
the pandemic has been guided by calculable parameters,
such as case count, or the reproduction number, R0. This
bears the danger that the metric becomes the target of
policy, and thereby the metric starts to define the solution.
With the pandemic, we could have weighed the public
health effects of lockdown measures themselves, including
missed screenings and treatments, delayed vaccinations,
mental health impacts, and food insecurity, as well as the
economic and social impacts. In addition, the blanket
strategies aimed at particular metrics missed the equity
dimensions of who bears the harms from the measures:
much of the burden of lockdowns falls upon the global
poor4. Moreover, longer-term aims of dealing with root
causes of zoonotic disease transmissions were eclipsed.
The media’s interest in trackable metrics may exacerbate
such narrowing of policy goals. But the challenge of
translating model knowledge into real-world actions also
contributes. For example, the reproduction number has been
mobilized in policy as a population-wide metric in some
jurisdictions5.
Climate policy too has become focused on a single metric,
global average temperature6. This number is merely a proxy
for a multitude of desired outcomes including human
security and sustainable development, biodiversity, inter-
generational justice, etc. If this metric begins to define the
solution, a strategy that is measured in terms of global mean
temperature, like stratospheric aerosol injection, looks
attractive. However, for climate change as for the pandemic,
whole-of-society strategies that take in a broader range of
goals are also needed. We must strive to understand the
second-order effects of various measures, from mitigation
and adaptation policies to climate engineering. And the root
causes must not be forgotten.
We are in the early days of understanding complex socio-
ecological interactions. But the remedy here is not simply to
perfect a single, dominant methodology. Rather, multiple
methods are needed to inform whole-of-society responses to
wicked problems—complex social problems that are inter-
dependent on other problems and have no single or final
solution7—such as climate change.
2. Global governance is fragmented or missing.
The diverse responses to COVID-19 in different countries
sharply illustrate that we do not have a single global society.
Different societies have different priorities, interests, and
cultures of knowledge and policy, and game-theoretic
modeling is not sufficient to explain them. As a result, the
COVID-19 responses have been a mosaic of different
strategies and controversies. The rush to compete for
vaccines, medicines, and equipment, along with attacks on
the World Health Organization—the only international
organization available—show that global governance and
common interests are ideals to aim for, but cannot be
assumed to be in place8.
By cementing nationalist response patterns, the reactions
to the pandemic have arguably left the world (even) less
well prepared for dealing with climate change. Much
modeling of stratospheric aerosol injection assumes a
singular global aim and comprehensive global governance
that approximates this world-aggregation. Yet the frac-
tures of the international system mean that such a global
planner, whether it be an institution or an algorithm, does
not exist.
3. Media technologies create new volatilities for science and
policy.
Technology platforms are affecting societal debates in new
ways, with emerging dynamics around both the sense of
emergency and the perceptions of what constitutes an
appropriate response. These dynamics vary between coun-
tries. In some countries, technology platforms offered an
opportunity for jurisdictions to tighten social surveillance
related to COVID-19 as well as an opportunity to try to
improve their image globally. In other countries, social
media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, along
with new and established media organizations, created both
cohesion and divergence. For COVID-19 in the US, one set
of social norms, encouraged by established media organiza-
tions and promulgated through social media platforms,
emerged around a singular idea of what “the science”
dictated. At the same time, polarization and divergence
emerged around key elements of the response. Compound-
ing these dynamics is the affective dimension of social media
use: for example, a study in China found that anxiety and
depression during COVID-19 were associated with exposure
to social media platforms like Weibo and WeChat9.
If the debate around responding to climate change by
stratospheric aerosol injection enters a similar dynamic, a
single narrative of what “the science” on the technique says
could cohere and dominate the mainstream media outlets,
while simultaneously, public views could become polarized.
This could be dangerous if the mainstream media position
emerges as a blanket votum, regardless of whether it is for or
against stratospheric aerosol injection: for any narrative to
become unquestionable dogma is against the core idea of
scientific inquiry. In addition, like for COVID-19, a sense of
anxiety around the idea of climate emergency could
influence decision-making on stratospheric aerosol injection
in unexpected—and potentially unhelpful—ways.
What remains to be studied is how the dynamics of social
media are feeding back into the conduct of the science itself.
For example, the high-profile retraction10 at The Lancet of a
paper indicating that hydroxychloroquine was not effective
provoked questions in the media about the politics of the
journal. The decision to publish the article in the first place
highlights the structural question of how media and political
implications might influence research in unhelpful ways.
Consider the case of a model, published11 in Science, which
suggested a herd immunity threshold for COVID-19 at 43%.
The editors were concerned that the finding would be used
to downplay concerns about COVID-19, and discussed
whether publishing the results was in the public interest12.
In this feedback loop, journal editors are grappling with the
anticipated media response to findings.
When it comes to stratospheric aerosol injection, this is a
dangerous place to be. On one hand, scientists might be
incentivized to perform modeling on questions with a strong
narrative appeal; on the other hand, they might face
pushback from the community if their results challenge
what is seen to be in the public interest. Such feedback loops
are detrimental to the pursuit of science, but if we identify
them, we may be able to change them.
4. Politicians may take action for the sake of action—
or worse.
Politicians may use performative measures to advance
unrelated goals. For example, with COVID-19 in China, it
was important to demonstrate that the outbreak was under
control. The allure of performative measures potentially
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includes democratic regimes that may find themselves under
pressure to demonstrate doing something, especially if they
are constrained from taking other actions by vested
interests. For example, in the US response to COVID-19,
the lack of a response from the federal government led state
governments to turn to mask mandates, which were a highly
visible, universally experienced, and low-cost precautionary
measure. Strict mask mandates led to debates about the
evidence base for them, with the risk that extensive debates
on masking policies may draw attention away from more
complex and less visible social and policy challenges, like
how to protect people in care homes.
Similarly, being seen to carry out an adequate or even
aggressive response to climate change may become a part of
maintaining regime legitimacy. Stratospheric aerosol injec-
tion may be a similarly performative measure that a
politician can introduce before there is a strong evidence
base supporting or detracting from it. In a limited attention
economy, stratospheric aerosol injection may then distract
from a regime’s failure to adapt or mitigate, as well as draw
focus away from other climate goals.
5. Buy time only with a plan in hand.
Stopgap measures to buy time for longer-term action carry
the particular risk that the initial objective is forgotten, and
eventually maintaining the stopgap becomes the goal.
Alternatively, there is a risk that the time that is bought is
not used efficiently, which makes it necessary to perpetuate
the stopgap. The definitions and conditions of ill thought-
out stopgaps can morph as time passes. With the pandemic,
lockdown measures were introduced as a way to “flatten the
curve”. They were intended to buy time to scale up testing
and contact-tracing capacity, procure protective equipment,
and learn how to treat the virus. This strategy was effective
in some nations. However, in the US context, the time that
was bought with the lockdowns in March and April of 2020
was not used well, and by the summer of 2020, the US faced
a strong resurgence in cases.
When it comes to climate change, stratospheric aerosol
injection has been discussed as a stopgap measure that can
buy time for more systemic solutions13. Experience with
COVID-19 illustrates how, especially under poor leadership,
publics may misunderstand the goal, duration, and nature of
the stopgap measure, and politicians may not be held
accountable for failing to make use of the time. For
stratospheric aerosol injections, ideally, the bought time
could be used to decarbonize, bringing emissions to net-zero
and developing capacities to remove carbon from the
atmosphere. But the mechanism for holding politicians
accountable to those goals has yet to be developed, and
future politicians may decide to change the goals. With
stratospheric aerosols, widespread public discussion well in
advance may help mitigate some of the risks of it becoming
an interminable stopgap.
Towards anticipatory research
COVID-19 has been a stress test for the interactions between sci-
ence, media, and politics both nationally and globally, and it has
revealed complex and potentially harmful dynamics in the links
between these spheres. The pandemic response further highlights
the need not just for anticipatory governance, but for transdisci-
plinary, anticipatory research ahead of an actual emergency.
For the case of stratospheric aerosol injection in a climate
change emergency, we need research that is reflexive about how
its implementation may be attempted by real-world (instead of
imagined) policymakers in sub-optimal situations, for example, as
a performative measure or as a shifting stopgap. Some of the open
questions and governance challenges identified here cannot be
addressed by scientists alone. Others, however, are well within the
influence of individual research groups and institutions. We need
a very broad range of expertises, including psychologists, sociol-
ogists, economists, development practitioners, International
Relations experts, and others working together to produce this
reflexive research.
It would be desirable to have a pre-developed policy tool that
helps foresee complex socio-economic consequences, can be
employed by a transdisciplinary network and is legible to diverse
publics. Such a process cannot be summoned at will during a
crisis. Given the centrality of scenario analysis in the climate
discourse, international, transdisciplinary scenario research
(combining climate science, impact assessment, and integrated
assessment) would be highly desirable14. It is important to have a
diversity of thought within—not only between—disciplines, to
avoid groupthink and bandwagoning. Researchers can inoculate
against this risk by using what’s been called a “red team/blue
team” approach, where some research groups work on best-case
use scenarios while other teams systematically look for failure
modes, as David Keith and others have discussed15.
Despite what COVID-19 has revealed about the dysfunction of
the science–media-policy ecosystem, it also contains a hopeful
lesson: people are willing to take radical action to save the lives of
the vulnerable. Around the world, there has been wide com-
pliance with social distancing during the first months of the
pandemic even though many groups bear little risk from the virus
themselves. The experience with COVID-19 suggests that the
possibility of an altruistically motivated climate intervention
should not be discounted.
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